Abstract. This paper proposes a paraconsistent and nonmonotonic extension of description logic by planting a nonmonotonic mechanism called minimal inconsistency in paradoxical description logics, which is a paraconsistent version of description logics. A precedence relation between two paradoxical models of knowledge bases is firstly introduced to obtain minimally paradoxical models by filtering those models which contain more inconsistencies than others. A new entailment relationship between a KB and an axiom characterized by minimal paradoxical models is applied to characterize the semantics of a paraconsistent and nonmonotonic description logic. An important advantage of our adaptation is simultaneously overtaking proverbial shortcomings of existing two kinds extensions of description logics: the weak inference power of paraconsistent description logics and the incapacity of nonmonotonic description logics in handling inconsistencies. Moreover, our paraconsistent and nonmonotonic extension not only preserves the syntax of description logic but also maintains the decidability of basic reasoning problems in description logics. Finally, we develop a sound and complete tableau algorithm for instance checking with the minimally paradoxical semantics.
Introduction
Description logics (DLs) [1] are a family of formal knowledge representation languages which build on classical logic and are the logic formalism for Frame-based systems and Semantic Networks. E.g. DLs are the logical foundation of the Web Ontology Language (OWL) in the Semantic Web [2] which is conceived as a future generation of the World Wide Web (WWW). As is well known, ontologies or knowledge bases (KBs) in an open, constantly changing and collaborative environment might be not prefect for a variety of reasons, such as modeling errors, migration from other formalisms, merging ontologies, ontology evolution and epistemic limitation etc [3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . That is, it is unrealistic to expect that real ontologies are always logically consistent and complete. However, DLs, like classical logics, are not good enough to represent some non-classical features of real ontologies [4] such as paraconsistent reasoning and nonmonotonic reasoning.
In order to capture these non-classical features of ontologies or KBs, several extensions of DLs have been proposed. They can be roughly classified into two two categories. The first (called paraconsistent approach) is extending paraconsistent semantics into DLs to tolerate inconsistencies occurring in ontologies, e.g., based on Belnap's four-valued logic [8, 9] , Besnard and Hunter's quasi-classical logic [10], Elvang-Gøransson and Hunter's argumentative logic [11] and Priest's paradoxical logic [12] . While these paraconsistent semantics can handle inconsistencies in DLs in a way, they share the same shortcoming: their reasoning ability is too weak to infer useful information in some cases. For instance, the resolution rules do not work in four-valued DLs [8, 9] and paradoxical DLs [12] ; the application of proof rules are limited in a specific order in quasi-classical DLs [10] ; and the proof systems are localized in subontologies in argumentative DLs [11] . Moreover, the reasoning in most of existing paraconsistent DLs is monotonic and thus they are not sufficient to express evolving ontologies coming from a realistic world.
Considering a well known example about tweety: let K be a KB whose TBox is {Bird F ly, Bird W ing} and ABox is {Brid(tweety), ¬F ly(tweety)}. In short, K tells us that all birds can fly, all birds have wings and tweety is a bird and cannot fly. It is easy to see that K is inconsistent. In our view, it might be reasonable that tweety has wings since the fact that tweety cannot fly doesn't mean that tweety hasn't wings, e.g., penguin has wings but it cannot fly. However, W ing(tweety) could not be drawn from K in four-valued DLs [9] or in paradoxical DLs [12] . W ing(tweety) is unknown in argumentative DLs [11] . Though W ing(tweety) might be inferred in quasi-classical DLs [10], both Bird(tweety) and F ly(tweety) are taken as "contradiction" (both true and flase). In this sense, the quasi-classical inference might bring over contradictions. In addition, assume that we get a new information ¬Bird(tweety) about tweety. That is, we have known that tweety is not bird. Intuitively, we would not conclude that either tweety can fly or tweety has wings. A new KB could be is obtained by adding ¬Bird(tweety) in K. However, conclusions from the new KB are the same as K in quasi-classical DLs. In other words, reasoning based on quasi-classical semantics cannot capture nonmonotonic feature of a true world.
The second (called nonmonotonic approach) is extending DLs with nonmonotonic features, e.g., based on Reiter's default logic [13] , based on epistemic operators [14, 15] and based on McCarthy's circumscription [16] . They provide some versions of nonmonotonic DLs. However, they are still unable to handle some inconsistent KBs because they are based on classical models. In other words, the capability of inconsistency handling is limited. For instance, in the tweety example, the original KB tells us that all birds can fly. When we find that penguin are birds which are unable to fly, we will usually amend the concept of bird by treating penguin as an exception (of birds) in those nonmonotonic DLs. It is impossible that we could enumerate all exceptions from incomplete KBs. Therefore, nonmonotonic mechanisms, in our view, might not be competent for deal with inconsistencies.
As argued above, paraconsistent DLs and nonmonotonic DLs have their advantages and disadvantages. It would be interesting to investigate paraconsistent nonmonotonic DLs by combining both paraconsistent and nonmonotonic approaches. While such ideas are not new in knowledge representation, it is rarely investigated how to define a paraconsistent nonmonotonic semantics for DLs. The challenge of combining paraconsistent DLs with nonmonotonic DLs is to preserve the features of classical DLs while some non-classical features such as nonmonotonicity and paraconsistency in DLs are incorported. Ideally, such a semantics should satisfy the following properties: (1) It is
